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NOTE
Compliance Issues: The Supreme Court’s
Confusing Messages to Municipalities
Willson v. City of Bel-Nor, Missouri, 924 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2019)
Abigail Greene*

I. INTRODUCTION
Local municipalities are vested with the power to enact zoning
ordinances that prohibit signs and flags in residential areas for aesthetic
purposes.1 This power directly competes with an individual’s constitutional
right to use private property to express their views. The United States
Supreme Court recently struck a balance for this conflict in Reed v. Town of
Gilbert.2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied
this test in Willson v. City of Bel-Nor, Missouri3 and demonstrated the
impracticability of the approach the Supreme Court created for municipalities
when drafting ordinances.
This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit’s decision illustrates the
unreasonably nuanced approach required by the Supreme Court’s new test.
To a constitutional specialist, Reed makes sense. However, while attractive
at first glance, it expects too much of local municipalities by requiring them
to undertake an extensive analysis to pass a constitutionally sound ordinance.
Willson is a good example of how careful municipalities must be to ensure
they are drafting facially content-neutral ordinances. This facial distinction is
often the difference between an enforceable and unenforceable ordinance.
A more detailed ordinance, however, does not equate with the ordinance
being enforceable. In fact, more detailed and comprehensive ordinances –
often invoking definitions and exemptions – are more likely to be struck down
as unconstitutional. Small changes in drafting can be the difference between
withstanding or failing a First Amendment challenge, and this is the essence
* B.J., University of Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020. I am grateful
to Dean Lyrissa Lidsky for her insight, guidance, and support during the writing of
this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1. Stephanie L. Bunting, Unsightly Politics: Aesthetics, Sign Ordinances, and
Homeowners’ Speech in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 473, 474
(1996).
2. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
3. 924 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2019).
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of the practical problem municipalities face in the wake of Reed.
Municipalities must include enough detail to protect the interests at issue,
while excluding any details that reference the content of the speech sought to
be regulated.
Part II of this Note provides the facts and holding of Willson. Then, part
III examines the development of First Amendment law, including the recent
developments of Reed and subsequent cases. Part IV discusses the instant
decision of the Eighth Circuit in Willson, and Part V describes why Willson
illustrates the challenging precedent created by Reed. Finally, Part VI
evaluates the continuing challenges municipalities will face when attempting
to draft constitutional speech restrictions.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In September 2017, the city of Bel-Nor passed Ordinance 983 (“the
Ordinance”), codified as Bel-Nor Municipal Code Section 400.120(E).4 BelNor is a northwestern suburban city located in St. Louis County, Missouri,5
and as of the 2010 census, it had a population of 1499.6 Under the Ordinance,
“each improved parcel may have up to one stake-mounted, freestanding sign”7
and “[n]ot more than one (1) flag.”8 A sign is defined as:
Any poster, object, devise [sic], or display, situated outdoors, which is
used to advertise, identify, display, direct or attract attention to an
object, person, institution, organization, business, product, service,
event, idea, belief or location by any means, including but not limited
to words, letters, figures, designs, symbols, colors, logos, fixtures,
cartoons or images.9

A flag is defined as “any fabric or bunting containing distinctive colors,
patterns or symbols used as a symbol of a government or institution.”10
Additionally, the Ordinance explicitly states that “‘flags’ shall not be
considered ‘signs.’”11

4. Id.
5. About Bel-Nor, CITY OF BEL-NOR, https://www.cityofbelnor.org/about
[perma.cc/4BDR-Y35C] (last visited Mar 8, 2020).
6. Bel-Nor Village, Missouri, AM. FACT FINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/f
aces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml?src=bkmk [perma.cc/AC5Q-RPLB] (last
visited Mar. 8, 2020).
7. Willson, 924 F.3d at 999.
8. Id. at 999–1000.
9. Id. at 1000.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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At the time of the proceedings, Lawrence Willson was a resident of BelNor.12 In December 2017, Willson was charged with violating the Ordinance
because he had three “stake-mounted, freestanding signs” in the front yard of
his home.13 Since 2016, he had displayed “Clinton Kaine” and “Jason Kander
U.S. Senate” signs, and since 2014, he had displayed a “Black Lives Matter”
sign.14 Willson sought a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the
Ordinance was in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, as
it was content-based because “its flag exemption imposes different restrictions
on signs depending on their content.”15 The City of Bel-Nor asserted the
Ordinance was not content-based.16 According to Bel-Nor, the Ordinance
included an “exceptionally broad definition of institution, encompassing any
significant practice, relationship or organization in a society or culture.”17
Additionally, the City argued there was no risk of infringing on First
Amendment rights because there were three different surfaces, specifically
two different sides of a sign and one flag, on which to communicate thoughts
and ideas.18 Further, Bel-Nor asserted the Ordinance was justified by traffic
safety as well as aesthetic concerns and was narrowly tailored to serve those
interests.19
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
denied Willson’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding he was unlikely
to succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim.20 First, the district
court determined that Willson lacked standing to challenge the flag
exemption, as there was “no evidence that it affected” him.21 The court further
held that the Ordinance was content-neutral and narrowly-tailored to address
the aesthetics and traffic safety concerns of Bel-Nor.22
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court’s decision.23 First, the Eighth Circuit found that
Willson had standing to challenge the “portions of the [Ordinance] which
provide the basic definitional structure for the terms used in the violated
12. Willson v. City of Bel-Nor, Mo., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1215 (E.D. Mo.
2018), rev’d and remanded, 924 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2019)
13. Willson, 924 F.3d at 999.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1000. Willson also argued that Ordinance 983 was vague and
overbroad, also in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, however,
I do not analyze either of these claims in depth for the purposes of this Note.
16. Id. at 1001.
17. Id. at 1001 (internal quotations omitted).
18. Id. at 1003.
19. Id. To support the contention that the ordinance is narrowly tailored, the city
offered testimony of the Mayor, who discussed concern about distracted driving and
stated the ordinance reflects that interest in public policy. Id. at 1002.
20. Id. at 999.
21. Id. at 1000.
22. Id. at 999. The district court also rejected Willson’s overbreadth challenge.
Id.
23. Id. at 1004.
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sections and which more generally define the scope of signs allowed by the
violated sections.”24 Next, the Eighth Circuit held that the Ordinance was
content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.25 Further, the court
stated it was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest
and thus did not satisfy the strict scrutiny requirement.26 The Eighth Circuit
ultimately held that the preliminary injunction should be granted because
Willson was likely to succeed on the merits of his First Amendment
challenge.27

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment prohibits laws that restrict expression because of
“its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”28 Both written and
spoken word clearly fall within the parameters of First Amendment
protection.29 The First Amendment also protects particular actions that
express ideas, in other words, “expressive conduct.”30 The Supreme Court
has articulated a test to determine whether expressive conduct is protected
under the First Amendment: “[A]n individual claiming an activity
[is] protected . . . must show that the activity is intended to express a
particularized message that would likely be understood by others.”31 For
example, the Court has found that burning an American flag to protest
government actions is protected.32
Local municipalities are vested with the power to enact ordinances that
restrict the permitted uses of property in a given area.33 This power directly
competes with individual rights and the desire to live without governmental
interference.34 An example of this tension is easily seen in municipal
ordinances that “restrict or prohibit the flying of flags, pennants, or banners
by individuals in a noncommercial setting” because these limitations can

24. Id. at 1000 (quoting Neighborhood Enter., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d
728, 735 (8th Cir. 2011)).
25. Id. at 1001.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1004.
28. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
29. Angelica M. Sinopole, “No Saggy Pants”: A Review of the First Amendment
Issues Presented by the State’s Regulation of Fashion in Public Streets, 113 PENN ST.
L. REV. 329, 335 (2008).
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569–71 (1995); Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 409
(1974)).
32. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 490 (1989).
33. Bunting, supra note 1, at 476.
34. Jay M. Zitter Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Zoning
Ordinances Regulating Display of Noncommercial Flags or Banners, 103 A.L.R. 5th
445 (2002).
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interfere with First Amendment rights. 35 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has noted the importance and uniqueness of residential signs as a mode of
expression, as they are “unusually cheap and convenient” and “[d]isplaying a
sign in one’s own residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing
the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other
means.”36

A. Levels of Scrutiny
Not all laws that restrict speech are analyzed under the same standard.
The level of scrutiny a court applies to a constitutional challenge depends on
whether the restriction is content-based or content-neutral.37 Two different
levels of scrutiny are applied based on the type of speech restriction: strict
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny.38 This distinction is critical, as restrictions
subject to intermediate scrutiny have a much higher chance at surviving a
constitutional challenge, while strict scrutiny is generally fatal.39
Content-based restrictions limit speech based on the message
conveyed.40 These restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional and subject
to strict scrutiny, meaning they are only justified if the government shows they
further a compelling interest and are “narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.”41 To satisfy the narrowly tailored requirement, the facts must
demonstrate “a real need for the government to act to protect its interests.”42
The government must be able to prove that “no less restrictive alternative”
would serve its purpose.43 Some common examples of content-based
restrictions are “laws that prohibit seditious libel, ban the publication of
confidential information, forbid the hiring of teachers who advocate the

35. Id.
36. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 44, 56 (1994).
37. Sinopole, supra note 29, at 358.
38. Id. at 334.
39. “[A] law rarely survives [strict] scrutiny.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,
200 (1992). “Content-based laws receive strict scrutiny, which nearly always proves
fatal.” Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 237
(2012). “If there is one First Amendment rule that is clearer than any other, it is that
the determination that a regulation is content-based or content-neutral will almost
always determine if the regulation will be invalidated or upheld.” Enrique
Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV. 65, 92 (2017).
40. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983).
41. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226, 2231 (2015); Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
395 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
42. Johnson v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation Bd., 729 F.3d 1094, 1099 (8th
Cir. 2013).
43. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
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violent overthrow of government, or outlaw the display of the swastika in
certain neighborhoods.”44
Conversely, content-neutral restrictions limit speech regardless of the
message conveyed.45 These restrictions “do not pose the same inherent
dangers to free expression” because the restriction is not related to the subject
or topic of the speech.46 They are subject to intermediate scrutiny, meaning
the restriction will be constitutional “if it advances important governmental
interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.”47
Examples of this type of restriction are “laws that prohibit noisy speeches near
a hospital, ban billboards in residential communities, impose license fees for
parades and demonstration, or forbid the distribution of leaflets in public
places.”48 Notably, laws that restrict signs solely based on numbers are largely
found content-neutral.49

B. The Supreme Court’s Standards of Review
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the
standard for determining if a law was content-neutral was whether “the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with
the message it conveys.”50 If the purpose and justification of the law was
neutral, the restriction usually received lesser scrutiny.51 Consequently,
courts generally presumed sign ordinances were valid.52 However, the
Supreme Court, in 2015, developed a new content-discrimination
methodology to balance speech rights and governmental interests.53 This

44. Stone, supra note 40, at 190.
45. Id. at 189–90.
46. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997) (quoting Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.F.C., 512 U.S. 622, 661 (1994)) (citation omitted).
47. Id. “[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
or manner of protected speech, so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.” George L. Blum, Construction and
Application of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., Providing that Speech Regulation
Targeted at Specific Subject Matter Is Content-Based Even If It Does Not Discriminate
Among Viewpoints Within That Subject Matter, 24 A.L.R. 7th Art. 6 (2017).
48. Stone, supra note 40, at 189–90.
49. “The state’s first obligation under the Speech Clause is to treat ideas equally
and impartially, and content-neutral restrictions treat ideas equally and impartially,
irrespective of the nature or number of ideas that they actually restrict.”
Armijo, supra note 39, at 65, 95 (emphasis added).
50. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
51. Id.
52. Bunting, supra note 1, at 474.
53. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).
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revised analysis delayed determining the government’s intent, making that
inquiry relevant only if the law was facially neutral.54

1. Reed v. Town of Gilbert
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Town of Gilbert adopted a sign code that
prohibited displaying outdoor signs anywhere in the town without a permit,
with the exception of twenty-three categories of signs, including ideological
signs, political signs, and temporary directional signs.55 In determining
whether the Town’s Sign Code was a content-based restriction, the Court set
out an analytical framework to determine content-neutrality. First, the
reviewing body must determine whether the restriction is “content neutral on
its face.”56 The Court noted that some regulations are more obviously facially
content-based, while other regulations are more subtle.57 Therefore, courts
must inquire into not only if a regulation defines speech by a particular subject
matter but also whether a regulation defines speech by its function or
purpose.58 This illustrates that a speech restriction is deemed content-based

54. Armijo, supra note 39, at 67.
55. Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2224–25.
Three categories of exempt signs are particularly relevant here. The first is
“Ideological Sign[s].” This category includes any “sign communicating a
message or ideas for noncommercial purposes that is not a Construction Sign,
Directional Sign, Temporary Directional Sign Relating to a Qualifying Event,
Political Sign, Garage Sale Sign, or a sign owned or required by a
governmental agency.” Of the three categories discussed here, the Code treats
ideological signs most favorably, allowing them to be up to 20 square feet in
area and to be placed in all “zoning districts” without time limits. The second
category is “Political Sign[s].” This includes any “temporary sign designed to
influence the outcome of an election called by a public body.” The Code treats
these signs less favorably than ideological signs. The Code allows the
placement of political signs up to 16 square feet on residential property and up
to 32 square feet on nonresidential property, undeveloped municipal property,
and “rights-of-way.” These signs may be displayed up to 60 days before a
primary election and up to 15 days following a general election. The third
category is “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event.”
This includes any “Temporary Sign intended to direct pedestrians, motorists,
and other passersby to a ‘qualifying event.’” A “qualifying event” is defined
as any “assembly, gathering, activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged, or
promoted by a religious, charitable, community service, educational, or other
similar non-profit organization.” The Code treats temporary directional signs
even less favorably than political signs. Temporary directional signs may be
no larger than six square feet. They may be placed on private property or on
a public right-of-way, but no more than four signs may be placed on a single
property at any time. And, they may be displayed no more than 12 hours
before the ‘qualifying event’ and no more than 1 hour afterward.
Id. (internal citations omitted).

56. Id. at 2228.
57. Id. at 2227.
58. Id.
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“even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject
matter.”59 A restriction that is content-based on its face will be subject to strict
scrutiny regardless of the government’s motive.60 “In other words, an
innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one
that is content neutral.”61 Further, some facially content-neutral laws may be
deemed content-based if “there is a content-based purpose behind their
application.”62 Put differently, “[L]aws that cannot be justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, or that were adopted by the
government because of disagreement with the message the speech conveys”
are content-based.63
The Court held the sign restriction was content-based on its face,
triggering strict scrutiny without the need to consider “justifications or
purposes for enacting the code.”64 Additionally, the Town’s alleged
governmental interests in enacting the restriction were to preserve aesthetic
appeal and enhance traffic safety.65 The Court found that even if it were to
consider those compelling interests, the restrictions “fail as hopelessly
underinclusive”66 because the restriction “leaves appreciable damage to that
supposedly vital interest unprohibited.”67 In the unanimous decision, all
justices agreed the ordinance at issue was unconstitutional because the
restriction “depend[ed] entirely on the communicative content of the sign.”68
However, not all agreed on how far the opinion went in creating a new
analysis for content-neutrality. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kagan
discussed the significance of this decision and its impact on the thousands of
reasonable town ordinances that could be invalidated.69 Justice Kagan wrote,
“I see no reason why such an easy case calls for us to cast a constitutional pall
on reasonable regulations quite unlike the law before us” and determined a
possible consequence of this decision would be that “[t]his Court may soon
find itself a veritable Supreme Board of Sign Reviews.”70

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2228.
Id.
RONALD KROTOSZYNSKI ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND
THEORY (3d ed. 2017).
63. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2231.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002)).
68. Id. at 2227.
69. Id. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring).
70. Id.
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C. Implications of Reed on Subsequent Free Speech Challenges in
Circuit Courts
In the wake of Reed, lower courts have applied the elements of contentneutrality as specified; however, there have been varying outcomes based on
small intricacies. This Section discusses the differing outcomes of the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, District of Columbia, Fourth
Circuit, and Sixth Circuit.

1. Ninth Circuit
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit examined five city ordinances regulating
mobile billboards and held all of the ordinances to be “content-neutral,
reasonable, time, place, and manner restrictions on speech.”71 These
ordinances are variations on a ban of advertisements attached to nonmotorized and motorized vehicles, and they permit civil penalties and
impounding of vehicles that violate the ordinance.72 The plaintiffs owned
billboards that were subject to the bans.73 The plaintiffs contended the bans
were facially invalid because they distinguished between billboards that
advertise and signs that do not.74 The Ninth Circuit recognized the ordinances

71. Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir.
2016).
72. Id. at 1196, 1198.
[S]ection 87.54 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (the “motorized mobile
billboard ordinance”) provides, in pertinent part:
A motor vehicle may contain advertising signs that are painted directly
upon or are permanently affixed to the body of, an integral part of, or
fixture of a motor vehicle for permanent decoration, identification, or
display and that do not extend beyond the overall length, width, or height
of the vehicle. Advertising signs that are painted directly upon or
permanently affixed to a motor vehicle shall not be painted directly upon
or permanently affixed in such a manner as to make the motor vehicle
unsafe to be driven, moved, parked or left standing on any public street
or public lands in the City. Motor vehicles that pose a safety hazard shall
be impounded pursuant to [the] California Vehicle Code . . . .
The other four ordinances (the “non-motorized mobile billboard ordinances”)
make it unlawful to park a “mobile billboard advertising display” on any
public street within city limits. The non-motorized mobile billboard
ordinances all incorporate the definition of “mobile billboard advertising
display” codified at California Vehicle Code section 395.5: “advertising
display[s]” that are attached to non-motorized vehicles, carry a sign or
billboard, and are “for the primary purpose of advertising.”
Id. at 1196 (internal citations omitted).

73. Id. at 1196.
74. Id. at 1197.
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did not define “advertising,” but Ninth Circuit precedent did.75 Therefore, the
court concluded the ordinances regulated the manner of speech, not the
content.76 Specifically, the court determined the ordinances addressed “only
the types of sign-bearing vehicles subject to regulation, and discriminate[d]
against prohibited billboards on the basis of their size and mobility alone, and
are thus content neutral.”77

2. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia Circuit examined a regulation of signs on
public lampposts and found it to be a content-neutral restriction.78 The
plaintiffs, two nonprofit organizations that used lampposts to advertise events,
sued the District of Columbia, challenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance.79 The court discussed how the government may impose contentneutral limitations on the “duration and manner in which the public uses
government property for expressive conduct like sign-posting.”80 The District
of Columbia Circuit distinguished this ordinance, one that “requires that,
whatever their content or viewpoint . . . signs be removed within thirty days
after the event to prevent them from accumulating as visual clutter,” from a
content-based ordinance that would target the communicative message “by
distinguishing among various events by topic.”81 Therefore, “The rule’s

75. Id. at 1199 (“[T]he California Court of Appeal has already recognized that
the word ‘advertising’ refers to the activity of displaying a message to the public, not
to any particular content that may be displayed.”).
76. Id. at 1200.
77. Id.
78. Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 846
F.3d 391, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. (2017).
In 2012, the District revised the regulation once more, yielding the version
now before us. Section 108 currently provides that any sign – including those
announcing events – may be affixed to a publicly owned lamppost for a
maximum of 180 days, but that signs relating to specific events must be
removed within 30 days after the event. The regulation also continues to
restrict the method of affixing signs on public lampposts: All signs must be
“affixed securely to avoid being torn or disengaged by normal weather
conditions,” but cannot “be affixed by adhesives that prevent their complete
removal from the fixture, or that do damage to the fixture.” Signs may not be
posted on “any tree in public space,” and no more than three copies of any sign
may be posted on either side of the street on a given block. The 2012 revision
also added subsection 108.13, which defines an “event” as “an occurrence,
happening, activity or series of activities, specific to an identifiable time and
place, if referenced on the poster itself or reasonably determined from all
circumstances by the inspector.

Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 397.
80. Id. at 403.
81. Id.
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clutter-minimizing rationale does not depend on the content of a sign’s
message.”82

3. Fourth Circuit
In Central Radio Co. Inc. v. City of Norfolk, Virginia,83 the Fourth
Circuit determined a sign ordinance, which restricted the size of the signs and
required eligible signs to be backed by a sign certificate showing the sign
complies with the code, was content-based.84 The plaintiffs were a “radio
manufacturing and repair business and two of its managers” who placed a
375-square-foot banner on the company’s building that stated “Eminent
Domain Abuse . . . 50 YEARS ON THIS STREET / 78 YEARS IN
NORFOLK / 100 WORKERS / THREATENED BY / EMINENT
DOMAIN.”85 The banner was used to symbolize a feud with the Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Authority.86 The plaintiffs filed suit to enjoin
the City of Norfolk from enforcing the sign ordinance.87 The plaintiffs alleged
that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it “exempted certain ‘flag[s]
or emblem[s]’ and ‘works of art’ from any similar limitations.”88 The alleged
reasoning for the restriction was to “‘enhance and protect the physical
82. Id.
83. 811 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2016).
84. Id. at 629, 633.
The former sign code applied to “any sign within the city which is visible from
any street, sidewalk or public or private common open space.” However, as
defined in the ordinance, the term “sign” did not encompass any “flag or
emblem of any nation, organization of nations, state, city, or any religious
organization,” or any “works of art which in no way identify or specifically
relate to a product or service.” Such exempted displays were not subject to
regulation under the former sign code. With respect to signs that were eligible
for regulation, the former sign code generally required that individuals apply
for a “sign certificate” verifying compliance with the code. Upon the filing of
such an application, the City was required to issue a “sign certificate” if the
proposed sign complied with the provisions that applied in the zoning district
where the sign was to be located. In the “I-1” industrial zoning district in
which plaintiff Central Radio Company Inc.’s (Central Radio) property is
located, the former sign code restricted the size of signs. The size restrictions
varied depending on whether a sign was categorized as a “temporary sign,”
which was permitted to be as large as 60 square feet, a “freestanding sign,”
which was permitted to be as large as 75 square feet, or an “other than
freestanding sign,” which was permitted to be as many square feet as the
number of linear feet of building frontage facing a public street. The City did
not patrol its zoning districts for violations of size restrictions or other
provisions of the former sign code, but did inspect displays in response to
complaints made by members of the public.

Id. at 629 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 628–30.
86. Id. at 630.
87. Id. at 630.
88. Id.
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appearance of all areas of the city,’ and to ‘reduce the distractions, and
obstructions and hazards to pedestrian and auto traffic caused by the excessive
number, size or height, inappropriate types of illumination, indiscriminate
placement or unsafe construction of signs.’”89 The Fourth Circuit deemed this
sign ordinance content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, which it could not
withstand.90 The court stated the ordinance was content-based on its face
because “it applied or did not apply as a result of content, that is, ‘the topic
discussed or the idea or message expressed.’”91 Namely, “[I]t exempted
governmental or religious flags and emblems, but applied to private and
secular flags and emblems.”92 Further, the ordinance did not satisfy strict
scrutiny because the City’s preferred compelling interests of aesthetics and
traffic safety were not compelling government interests.93

4. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit reconsidered a sign ordinance in light of the Reed
decision and deemed it content-based as well as subject to strict scrutiny.94
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 628.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 633 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).
Id.
Id.
Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights, 675 F. App’x 599, 607 (6th Cir. 2017).

[T]he City has enacted Garfield Heights Codified Ordinances Chapter 1140, a
comprehensive code of regulations that governs whether, when, and for how
long its residents, businesses, and visitors may post signs. These regulations
generally prohibit signs in residential areas. But given that Garfield Heights
acknowledges “the rights of [its] residents” to “speak freely,” Sections
1140.04(f) and 1140.361 of the Codified Ordinances allow residents to place
“temporary signs” measuring less than twelve square feet in surface area on
their lawns . . . . But “for-sale signs, sold signs, open house, for-rent, and
leasing signs, and signs of a religious, holiday, personal or political nature”
are subject to additional, more restrictive rules. Under Section 1140.361, only
one “for-sale, sold, for-rent, leasing, open house, religious, holiday or personal
sign’ not exceeding six square feet is permitted on a given lot in single-family
residential districts. Section 1140.362 extends this six-square-foot limit to
political signs and goes even further by providing that the limitation applies to
all political signs throughout Garfield Heights, including those in commercial
and industrial districts. By contrast, “religious,” “holiday,” “personal,” and
other non-political temporary signs in commercial and industrial districts can
generally be as large as twelve square feet in sign area without a permit, and
up to thirty-two square feet with a permit. Despite being subject to more
restrictive size constraints in non-residential areas, in residential areas,
political signs are subject to fewer overall restrictions than “for-sale, sold, forrent, leasing, open house, religious, holiday [and] personal” signs. Whereas
residents must remove these other signs within forty-eight hours after the signs
“fulfil[l] [their] purpose,” residents may leave political signs up for up to
seventy-two hours after an election. Additionally, despite some language in
the City’s ordinances to the contrary, Garfield Heights maintains that whereas
residents may post only one “for sale, sold, for-rent, leasing, open house,
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The plaintiff lived in the residential suburb of Cleveland, Ohio and placed a
sixteen-square-foot political sign on his lawn opposing a councilwoman’s
plan to implement a new municipal tax.95 He was charged with violating an
ordinance that placed limitations on the size of political signs residents could
have on their lawns.96 The plaintiff asserted that because the ordinance
distinguished between political signs and other signs, it was content-based.97
The court concluded that “the fact that a regulatory scheme requires a
municipality to examine the content of a sign to determine which ordinance to
apply should merely be seen as indicative, not determinative, of whether a
government has regulated for reasons related to content appears to run afoul
of Reed’s central teaching.”98
In 2019, the Sixth Circuit revisited the issue in Thomas v. Bright,99 where
it held the Tennessee Billboard Regulation and Control Act was content-based
and unconstitutional.100 The plaintiff owned over thirty billboards in
religious, holiday or personal” sign on their property, they may erect as many
political lawn signs as they want until they run up against a regulation that
restricts the “total sign face area of all temporary signs on a lot” to 0.675
square feet per foot of frontage. Thus, a Garfield Heights resident with fifty
feet of frontage could presumably post any number of political lawn signs so
long as their total sign face area does not exceed 33.75 square feet.
Id. at 601–02 (citations omitted).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 602.
Id.
Id. at 604.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
937 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 738.

The Billboard Act parallels the HBA in most relevant respects and prohibits
all outdoor signage within 660 feet of a public roadway unless expressly
permitted by TDOT permit. But the Act also provides exceptions under which
certain signs may be posted without permit, including an exception for signage
“advertising activities conducted on the property on which [the sign is]
located.” This is referred to as the “on-premises exception” and corresponds
to the HBA’s third limitation. Under the Act’s implementing regulations:
A sign will be considered to be an on-premise[s] sign if it meets the
following requirements: (a) Premise[s] - The sign must be located on the
same premises as the activity or property advertised. (b) Purpose - The
sign must have as its purpose (1) the identification of the activity, or its
products or services, or (2) the sale or lease of the property on which the
sign is located, rather than the purpose of general advertising.
The regulations elaborate further:
The following criteria shall be used for determining whether a sign has as
its purpose [ ] the identification of the activity located on the premises or
its products or services, . . . rather than the business of outdoor
advertising.
(a) General
1. Any sign which consists solely of the name of the establishment is an
on-premises sign.
2. A sign which identifies the establishment’s principle [sic] or accessory
product or services offered on the premises is an on-premises sign.
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Tennessee and used one billboard on a vacant lot to post a sign in support of
the 2012 United States Summer Olympic Team.101 The Act “prohibits all
outdoor signage within 660 feet of a public roadway unless expressly
permitted by . . . permit” but also contains exceptions “under which certain
signs may be posted without a permit.”102 The court stated that textually, the
Act “is a blanket, content-neutral prohibition on any and all signage speech
except for speech that satisfies an exception.”103 However, this exception,
which “favors certain content over others,” makes the Act content-based on
its face.104 The court also noted that it is irrelevant that this contentdiscrimination was part of the exception, rather than the restriction itself.105
The preceding cases are just a few of many that illustrate how Reed
affected lower courts and the vast amount of cases dealing with municipal
ordinances and sign regulations, specifically those that are allegedly
supported by the governmental interests of aesthetics and traffic safety. In
fact, the amount of detail in the ordinances themselves had the greatest
influence on determining whether the ordinance was content-based or contentneutral. As illustrated, ordinances with more overarching prohibitions were
found to be content-neutral and had a much greater chance at surviving a
constitutional challenge. Conversely, ordinances that either have lots of detail
in the ordinance itself, or within definitions and exceptions to the ordinance,
were found to be content-based and more difficult to defend when faced with
a constitutional challenge.

3. An example of an accessory product would be a brand of tires offered
for sale at a service station.
(b) Business of Outdoor Advertising
1. When an outdoor advertising device (1) brings rental income to the
property owner, or (2) consists principally of brand name or trade name
advertising, or (3) the product or service advertised is only incidental to
the principle [sic] activity, it shall be considered the business of outdoor
advertising and not an on-premises sign. An example would be a typical
billboard located on the top of a service station building that advertised a
brand of cigarettes or chewing gum which is incidentally sold in a
vending machine on the property.
2. An outdoor advertising device which advertises activities conducted on
the premises, but which also advertises, in a prominent manner, activities
not conducted on the premises, is not an on-premises sign. An example
would be a sign advertising a motel or restaurant not located on the
premises with a notation or attachment stating “Skeet Range Here,” or
“Dog Kennels Here.” The on-premises activity would only be the skeet
range or dog kennels.

Id. at 725–26 (citations omitted); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-21-101, et. seq.
(2019).
101. Id. at 726–27.
102. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 54-21-101, et. seq (2019); Thomas, 937 F.3d at 725.
103. 937 F.3d at 728.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit deemed Ordinance 983 (“the
Ordinance”) content-based and unconstitutional, reversing the lower court’s
decision.106 The panel ultimately determined Willson would likely succeed
on the merits of his First Amendment challenge, stating the preliminary
injunction should be granted.107
In an opinion written by Judge Benton, the Eighth Circuit first
determined the ordinance was content-based because “as written, Ordinance
983 draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.”108 The court
analyzed the definition of a sign compared to the definition of a flag109 and
concluded that “the content of a flag or sign determines whether it is a flag or
sign.”110 Therefore, to determine whether something is a flag or a sign, one
must inquire into “the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed” to
conclude if it will be prohibited by the Ordinance.111 The Eighth Circuit
rejected Bel-Nor’s contention that the Ordinance contains an exceptionally
broad definition of institution that does not pose a threat to free speech.112
Further, the Eighth Circuit dismissed Bel-Nor’s assertion that it would be
“difficult to imagine a message omitted by the Ordinance’s definition of a flag
as a symbol of a government or institution.”113 The court supported this
decision by finding the Ordinance drew a distinction “based on the message
the speaker conveys.”114 In fact, the court accepted Willson’s argument that
the Ordinance was written so broadly as to apply to “tacking up a ‘Welcome
Home’ banner on the garage, sticking an ADT Security window cling to the
front window, displaying Christmas lights, and tying a ‘Happy Birthday’
balloon to a front door on the day of a birthday party.”115
The Eighth Circuit next concluded that the Ordinance failed to satisfy
the strict scrutiny analysis required for a content-based restriction.116 The
Eighth Circuit conducted this analysis with the understanding that Bel-Nor
had the burden to demonstrate a compelling interest that the Ordinance was
narrowly tailored to achieve.117 Bel-Nor advanced justifications of traffic
safety and aesthetics.118 The court determined these are not compelling

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Willson v. City of Bel-Nor, Mo., 924 F.3d 995, 1004 (8th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 1001 (internal quotations omitted).
See supra Part II.
924 F.3d at 1000 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1001.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1002–03 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1001–02.
Id. at 1001.
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interests, meaning they fail the strict scrutiny test.119 It noted these commonly
asserted interests, while significant, have never been held to be compelling.120
The Eighth Circuit went on to say that even if the interests were compelling,
the Ordinance was not narrowly tailored, as Bel-Nor did not advance any
evidence stating it furthers the interests.121 The court rejected testimony from
Bel-Nor’s Mayor, determining the city’s abstract interest in public safety did
not satisfy the required “genuine nexus between the regulation and the interest
it seeks to serve.”122
Finally, the Eighth Circuit noted the risk of substantial limitation of free
expression rights, as residential signs have long been held to be an important
and distinct mode of expression.123 This is significant because the remaining
modes of communication are inadequate when viewed in light of the particular
benefits of residential signs, and therefore, there are not ample alternative
channels for communication.124 “Due to the special significance of the right
to speak from one’s own home, severe restrictions of this right do not afford
adequate alternatives.”125 The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, refusing
to take any further action regarding the Ordinance, as “[t]his court will not
rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional requirements.”126

V. COMMENT
The Eighth Circuit in Willson v. City of Bel-Nor correctly applied the
content-neutral analysis established in Reed v. Town of Gilbert. However,
Willson is a clear example of the practical consequences of Reed on municipal
sign ordinances, as well as the difficulties that arise when the analysis is
applied. The message Reed sends to local municipalities is: if a municipal
ordinance is going to be upheld, it must be facially-content neutral.
Furthermore, all aspects of the ordinance, including exemptions and
definitions, must satisfy this standard. Because municipalities have a right to
enact ordinances, it is important to examine the competing interests of both
the individuals within the community that are subject to the ordinance and the
municipalities drafting it.127

119. Id. at 1002.
120. Id.; see also Neighborhood Enters. v. St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 738 (8th Cir.
2011); Whitton v. Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1408 (8th Cir. 1995).
121. 924 F.3d at 1002.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994).
124. 924 F.3d at 1003.
125. Id. at 1004; see also Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 57 (“Residential signs are an
unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for persons of
modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical
substitute.”).
126. 924 F.3d at 1004 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481
(2010)).
127. Zitter, supra note 34.
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In the aftermath of Reed, municipalities around the country, including
the City of Bel-Nor, Missouri, have attempted to regulate the posting of signs,
mostly in the interests of aesthetics and traffic safety.128 As controlling
precedent, Reed subjects local municipalities to potential First Amendment
constitutional challenges by causing confusion during the drafting process of
sign ordinances. By encouraging municipalities to remove content-based
references in sign ordinances, Reed “significantly reduc[ed] the likelihood
that municipalities might regulate signage.”129
Municipalities and localities use ordinances, such as Ordinance 983, to
restrict “the uses of property in the area to improve conditions for the residents
in general.”130 Notably, “ordinances [are often] passed in order to rein in the
most severe abuses, not to restrict reasonable uses, but . . . the language used
[in the ordinances is] broad enough to cover a wide variety of essentially
innocent or unobtrusive flags or banners.”131 However, the majority in Reed
acknowledged the exact consequence lower courts are now facing:
Our decision today will not prevent governments from enacting
effective sign laws. The Town asserts that an “absolutist” contentneutrality rule would render “virtually all distinctions in sign laws . . .
subject to strict scrutiny,” . . . but that is not the case. Not “all
distinctions” are subject to strict scrutiny, only content-based ones are.
Laws that are content neutral are instead subject to lesser scrutiny.132

When examining Reed’s effect on lower courts’ decisions and
interpretations of local sign ordinances, the ordinances that were deemed
content-based largely contained more detail, either in the form of definitions
or exemptions.133 Essentially, a municipality must strike a balance between
drafting an ordinance with enough detail to effectively regulate land usage as
desired, while eliminating any references to the content of the message sought
to be regulated. This balance has been difficult to reach, as evidenced by
lower court decisions striking down numerous municipal ordinances in
various forms.134
Applying that to the case at hand, it is important to consider how the
Ordinance may have been altered to be constitutionally sound. Specifically,
would the Ordinance have been found facially content-neutral if there was no
distinction between a sign or flag? The Eighth Circuit recognized this
possibility by stating “even if Bel-Nor were to enforce the Ordinance without
distinguishing between flags and signs based on content, this court will ‘not

128. See supra Part III.
129. Armijo, supra note 39, at 74.
130. Zitter, supra note 34.
131. Id.
132. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015) (emphasis in original);
see Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
133. See supra Part III.
134. See supra Part III.
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uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the government promise[s]
to use it responsibly.’”135 This seems to imply that if Bel-Nor had not
distinguished between the definitions of a “sign” and a “flag,” the Ordinance
would have been constitutional. Further, the Eighth Circuit went on to state
that “as written, the ordinance draws a distinction based on the message
conveyed.”136 Again, this indicates the nuanced approach that the Eighth
Circuit took when analyzing the Ordinance.
What if “used as a symbol of a government or institution” was not
included in the definition of a “flag”?137 This seems to be the sticking point
of the First Amendment challenge. The court noted that “applying the
ordinary meaning of ‘government or institution,’ a fabric with a Cardinals
logo is a ‘sign,’ while a fabric with an Army logo is a ‘flag.’”138 Therefore,
the court concluded this inquiry shows the Ordinance’s prohibitions depend
on content and rejected Bel-Nor’s argument that the broad definition would
encompass “[a]ny significant practice, relationship or organization in a
society or culture.”139 The definition of a sign contained a longer list of uses
and means, but the court focused on the language of the definition of a “flag”
in the content-neutral analysis.140
Based on these observations, it is fair to assume that perhaps an
ordinance with a more general ban – possibly allowing two flags and/or signs
– may be constitutional because determining the Ordinance’s applicability
does not turn on the content of the communication but rather solely the
number of signs. However, the practical effects on residents of Bel-Nor are
the same under both this presumed constitutionally sound ordinance and
Ordinance 983: they can place two mediums on their residential property to
express their views.
This demonstrates the problem with the precedent created by Reed.
Practically, how is an ordinance that limits solely the number of mediums a
resident can place in their yard any more constitutional or less infringing on
free speech rights than one that allows for one of each defined type of sign
and flag? The First Amendment prohibits the government from regulating
speech based on the content of the speech, but how does regulating and
restricting the medium of how ideas are expressed not abridge First
Amendment rights? According to the Reed analysis, this restriction would
likely be constitutional because it would be subject to less scrutiny, solely
because of its facial content-neutrality.
“By giving contentneutral restrictions only the most cursory level of review regardless of

135. Willson v. City of Bel-Nor, 924 F.3d 995, 1001 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480, (2010)).
136. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
137. Id. at 1000.
138. Id. at 1000–01.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1000–01.
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those restrictions’ effects on speakers . . . the First Amendment has lost its
way.”141
The Eighth Circuit correctly examined the Ordinance on its face to
determine content neutrality, prior to inquiring into Bel-Nor’s alleged
justifications. Bel-Nor invoked aesthetics and traffic safety as compelling
interests. Notably, these interests seem to be the two most invoked rationales
for local sign ordinances.142 As noted above, however, aesthetics and traffic
safety are never found to be compelling governmental interests, and therefore,
will not satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.143 Conversely, aesthetics and
traffic safety are significant interests, which would have satisfied the
intermediate scrutiny standard applied to content-neutral restrictions.144
This brings Bel-Nor’s intentions in passing the Ordinance into question.
As Bel-Nor only presented evidence of aesthetic and traffic safety concerns,
this suggests that Bel-Nor thought the ordinance was facially content-neutral.
Under intermediate scrutiny, the Ordinance only needed to be supported by
significant interests, which aesthetics and traffic safety would satisfy.
Because these frequently invoked governmental interests are never
found to be compelling, it is important that municipalities draft constitutional
ordinances from the start, with great focus on making the restrictions facially
content neutral. Otherwise similar ordinances, although not necessarily
intended to be wide ranging, will likely be held unconstitutional.
In theory, it would be relatively easy for local municipalities to draft a
constitutional ordinance. So long as the municipality is aware of and follows
the jurisdiction’s requirements, it is possible to enact a rather restrictive and
constitutionally sound ordinance. While the courts in question applied Reed
equally, it is important to take a step back from this nuanced approach to
municipal sign ordinances.145
The tension between an individual’s right to do what he or she wants
without interference and a government’s right to enact ordinances restricting
speech to protect compelling governmental interests will continue under the
content-neutrality analysis created in Reed. Further, it will lead to
increasingly divergent results across jurisdictions based on nuances in specific
clauses and sentences. Municipalities will continue to be perplexed by these
results, as they hinge on facial distinctions, regardless of the practical
implications of the ordinances or the municipalities’ intent.
141. Armijo, supra note 39, at 92.
142. “This is so not merely because of the Reed decision, but also because of a
long line of cases finding that government interests in aesthetics and safety concerns
related to signage, such as lost or distracted drivers, are not compelling.” Id. at 70
(emphasis added).
143. See supra Part III.
144. Cynthia Mosher, What They Died to Defend: Freedom of Speech and Military
Funeral Protests, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587, 612 (2007).
145. “[I]t is quite true that regulations are occasionally struck down because of
their content-based nature, even though common sense may suggest that they are
entirely reasonable.” City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Willson v. City of Bel-Nor, Missouri, the Eighth Circuit used the
nuanced approach laid out by the Supreme Court in Reed to determine the
content-neutrality of a municipal sign ordinance. This approach condenses
the content-neutrality analysis down to a specific step-by-step requirement
while disregarding the tension it creates with practical outcomes.
Moving forward, municipalities must pay very close attention to the
speech restrictions they issue to comply with the stringent parameters set by
the Supreme Court and the interpretations of lower courts. If municipalities
want a chance to withstand a constitutional challenge, commonly drafted
speech restrictions need to pass through the first hurdle, which is the first step
of Reed: being facially content-neutral. Otherwise, the commonly alleged
interests of aesthetics and traffic safety will not be compelling.
The theoretically attractive reasoning of Reed will continue to affect
local municipalities in ways that appear to conflict with the general resources
available to municipalities and their ability to draft constitutional ordinances.
Without extensive research of their jurisdiction’s requirements and
interpretations of the Reed methodology, municipalities may think that
including more details in ordinances will lead to more effective regulations;
however, these details will determine whether a municipality finds itself under
stricter scrutiny of the courts.
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